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WAGING WAR ON THE RISING SEAS: FASHIONING A
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO COMBATING THE
EFFECTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON HAMPTON ROADS,
VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTALLATIONS UNDER
EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
PAUL HAWKINS*
INTRODUCTION
Putting it mildly, climate change is a contentious issue in policy
and political circles. While most of the scientific community is in agree-
ment about the causes and effects of global warming,1 this is far from the
case within the American political realm, especially in the United States
Congress.2 However, events may begin to overwhelm the conversation in
an area that should generate consensus—national security.
In 2003, Hurricane Isabel struck the eastern coast of Virginia.3 In
her crosshairs were the multiple, strategically important military instal-
lations that call the Hampton Roads area home.4 Langley Air Force Base
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018; B.S. Political Science, East Carolina
University, 2009. The author would like to thank the staff of the William & Mary Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy Review as well as scholars and practitioners in Hampton Roads
who have worked so diligently in this area and who were a great help throughout the
process. He would also like to thank his wife, Emily, who is always a constant source of
love and encouragement.
1 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2014), http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_Synthesis
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/73RN-MV5K] [hereinafter IPCC REPORT] (synthesizing the
most up-to-date worldwide climate science).
2 See Jeff Goodell, The Pentagon & Climate Change: How Deniers Put National Security
at Risk, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the
-pentagon-climate-change-how-climate-deniers-put-national-security-at-risk-20150212
[https://perma.cc/49G2-35A5].
3 Ali Rockett, Hampton Roads Military Bases Brace for Climate Change, Sea Level Rise,
THE DAILY PRESS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.dailypress.com/news/military/dp-nws-cli
mate-change-military-20141023-story.html [https://perma.cc/R7LP-NL6U].
4 This Note will utilize the localities included by the Hampton Roads Planning District
Commission when referring to “Hampton Roads.” This includes: the cities of Chesapeake,
Franklin, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Suffolk, Virginia Beach,
and Williamsburg; the counties of Gloucester, Isle of Wight, James City, Southampton,
Surry, and York; and the town of Smithfield. See Data and Info, HAMPTON ROADS
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(“Langley”), located in Hampton, Virginia, was particularly affected.5 The
hurricane rose the tidal level by a whopping 7.9 feet with the result of mas-
sive flooding throughout the base, causing damage to around two hun-
dred facilities.6 The bill for repairs and recovery totaled $166 million.7
In a scathing exposé in Rolling Stone magazine, Jeff Goodell
sounded the alarm bell on the adverse effects that climate change—and
particularly the secondary effects of sea level rise—are having on Hamp-
ton Roads’ military installations.8 Virginia Senator Tim Kaine is quoted
as saying that “[m]ilitary readiness is already being impacted by sea-level
rise.”9 The article further asserts that within 25–50 years operations could
go from being “severely compromised” to facilities themselves rendered
unusable.10 Even though these warnings are backed by thorough re-
search, little is being done about it from a Congressional level.11
Nonetheless, the Executive branch, through both Presidential and
Department of Defense (“DoD”) actions, has begun to take the issues of
climate change and sea level rise seriously. In the 2010 Quadrennial De-
fense Review, climate change was spoken of as a national security issue.12
The year before, the Navy had begun to address the issue through the es-
tablishment of Task Force Climate Change, presided over by the Navy’s
head oceanographer.13 Through establishment of these types of groups,
PLANNING DISTRICT COMMISSION, http://www.hrpdcva.gov/page/data-and-info [https://
perma.cc/9342-CC5B] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). Of note, the term “Tidewater” is also
used for the region but actually encompasses a larger area than the one described here.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-100. The issues implicated in this Note affect the entire region,
but are mainly focused in the southern portion of Hampton Roads—including the cities
of Norfolk, Portsmouth, Virginia Beach, and Hampton.
5 Rockett, supra note 3.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See Goodell, supra note 2.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See id. Goodell argues that members of Congress, whom he refers to as “climate change
deniers,” have not only ignored the national security implications of climate change, but
have been outright hostile to labeling the issue a national security concern, or even
further studying the issue. Examples include an amendment attached by a House com-
mittee forbidding the Pentagon from implementing recommendations from the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) and ignoring testimony
concerning climate change impacts.
12 See DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT FEB. 2010 84–85 (2010),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10
_1600.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JJE-C492] [hereinafter 2010 QDR].
13 See U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANGE, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/climate
-change/ [https://perma.cc/2T3X-9V7A] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
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the Navy and broader DoD conducted multiple studies and disseminated
their results. This has culminated in documents such as both the Navy’s
Climate Change Roadmap14 and the 2014 DoD Climate Change Road-
map.15 All of these documents touch on the need to adapt to the effects of
sea level rise on coastal installations.16 However, some adaptation efforts
have already taken place through the funding of small engineering projects
on bases with some success.17
One such example is Langley. As already stated, Langley sustained
severe damage in 2003. Afterwards, Air Force civil engineers began imple-
menting adaptation efforts the best they could.18 During later hurricanes,
such as Irene in 2011 and Sandy in 2012, damage was minimal despite
the amounts of tidal rise being roughly the same as 2003.19 These small
successes are certainly part of the solution going forward, but mere
“Band-Aids” are not enough since they do not address many of the over-
arching problems faced by the military in bracing against the rising sea
levels. Problems like partnering with local communities that the military
relies on for critical base services and implementing a long-term plan for
base relocations will necessitate creative policy and legal solutions in the
absence of comprehensive congressional action.
In Part I, this Note will first explore the general impact of sea
level rise on national security infrastructure, specifically looking at
Naval Station Norfolk and the surrounding installations in the Hampton
Roads area. Part II of this Note will discuss current DoD and local
policies as well some of the legal challenges these entities face in the ab-
sence of an overarching Congressional mandate. Finally, in Part III, this
Note will outline ways that the Department can more robustly utilize
existing frameworks to meet goals of sea level rise adaptation as well as
14 See TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANGE/OCEANOGRAPHER OF THE NAVY, U.S. NAVY CLIMATE
CHANGE ROADMAP (2010) [hereinafter NAVY CLIMATE CHANGE ROADMAP], http://green
fleet.dodlive.mil/files/2010/08/US-Navy-Climate-Change-Roadmap-21-05-10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WU2T-68KU].
15 See Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Releases 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Road-
map (Oct. 13, 2014) http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Ar
ticle/605221 [https://perma.cc/EF39-2LPQ].
16 See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION ROADMAP 6–7 (2014), [here-
inafter 2014 DOD ROADMAP] http://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/CCARprint_wForward
_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/T83E-WZ2K].
17 See Rockett, supra note 3.
18 Id. (highlighting examples of efforts included raising “[g]enerators, electrical systems,
air-conditioning units . . . above sea level” and installing other devices to help prevent water
intrusion into facilities. These measures cost roughly one million dollars over ten years).
19 Id. (reporting tidal rise for Irene and Sandy was 7.6 feet and 6.8 feet respectively).
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long-term realignment/closure of military bases. Such a comprehensive
approach will include: (1) expanded, innovative use of the Joint Land Use
Study (“JLUS”) Program to enhance communication and coordination
between DoD installations and local communities; (2) continued maximi-
zation of the use of discretionary military construction funds as well as
updating the Unified Facilities Criteria (“UFC”); and (3) ensuring sea
level rise is an important factor used by a future Base Realignment and
Closure Commission.
I. THE PROBLEM OF SEA LEVEL RISE FOR HAMPTON ROADS DOD
INSTALLATIONS: CAUSES AND IMPACTS
Sea level rise is but a mere symptom of the broader issue of climate
change.20 The vast majority of scientists now agree that the planet is warm-
ing at an accelerated pace and this warming is caused by human activity.21
In their most recent findings, the United Nations Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) reported that from 1880–2012 the
planet warmed by an average of 0.85°C.22 The IPCC also projects that by
the end of the twenty-first century the planet will warm by approximately
1.5°C.23 These findings are generally consistent with U.S. government
reports that have also been studying climate change and its effects.24
This warming of the planet will likely carry multiple severe conse-
quences, with sea level rise being one of the major challenges the world
will have to face. This part will delve into the general causes of sea level
rise, the measured rate of local sea level rise in the Hampton Roads area,
and finally the current and predicted effects of the phenomenon on
Hampton Roads military facilities and the neighboring localities.
A. General Causes and Effects of Sea Level Rise
Before looking at the specific impacts of sea level rise on the Hamp-
ton Roads region and its military infrastructure, it is important to under-
stand the overall causes of sea level rise and global average estimates.
20 See IPCC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2–17.
21 See id. at 2–4.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 10.
24 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, 2014 NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
28–29 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 NCA], http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report [https://
perma.cc/MUP3-2TU5].
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This information will provide a foundation with which to better under-
stand regional impacts. Both the IPCC as well as the U.S. government
have conducted large-scale studies and compiled reports on their find-
ings.25 These reports include both the U.S. National Climate Assessment
(“NCA”) and the IPCC’s most recent Synthesis Report (2014).26
The two drivers of increasing sea level rise are ocean expansion
and ice melt, both of which are due to increased surface temperatures.27
When the ocean warms, thermal expansion occurs as the water itself
expands.28 Concurrently, melting ice in both the Arctic and Antarctic re-
gions is adding immense amounts of water to the oceans, which in turn
is also contributing to higher sea levels throughout the world.29 While
there is slight disagreement over which factor is the larger contributor,30
it is simply important to see the observed causal connection between
these two phenomenon and rising global mean sea levels.
From a global perspective, sea level rise has generally been mea-
sured from a baseline of 1992 mean sea levels and projected out to 2100.31
Historically, sea levels rose by 0.2 meters (m) since 1900.32 The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (“NOAA”) 2012 sea level rise
conclusions, using various reports and scientific literature, noted that
there is “high confidence” that mean sea levels will rise between 0.2 m
(8 in.) and 2.0 m (6.6 ft.) by 2100.33 This takes into account four separate
lowest-to-highest scenarios.34
These various reports also conclude that sea level rise will be an
aggravator of other negative consequences of climate change.35 NOAA
concludes that “[sea level rise] amplif[ies] factors . . . [like] high tides,
storm surge[s], high waves, and high [amounts of] runoff from rivers.”36
25 See, e.g., id.; IPCC REPORT, supra note 1.
26 Id.
27 See IPCC REPORT, supra note 1, at 42; NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., GLOBAL
SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 5
(2012) [hereinafter NOAA REPORT] http://cpo.noaa.gov/sites/cpo/Reports/2012/NOAA_SLR
_r3.pdf [https://perma.cc/WS75-LNSF].
28 NOAA REPORT, supra note 27, at 5.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 3.
31 See, e.g., id. at 2.
32 Id.
33 NOAA REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
34 Id. at 2 (reporting the following scenarios: “lowest” 0.2 m; “intermediate-low” 0.5 m;
“intermediate-high” 1.2 m; and “highest” 2.0 m.)
35 See 2014 NCA, supra note 24, at 582.
36 NOAA REPORT, supra note 27, at 18.
270 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:265
The NCA’s section on coastal impacts of climate change projects that
there will be increases in hurricane rainfall and intensity as well as an
uptick in the number of winter storms such as nor’easters along the
Atlantic Coast.37 With a higher number of storms,38 sea level rise will
“increase the frequency, magnitude, and duration of flooding associated
with a given storm.”39 These observations and predictions do not bode
well for a low-lying coastal area like Hampton Roads, Virginia.
B. Hampton Roads: Local Sea Level Rise and Impacts
Local or regional sea level rise is measured in regards to the
relative sea level, which is defined as “[t]he height of the sea with respect
to a specific point of land.”40 Local sea level rise measurement relies on
historical data from established tidal gauges such as the Sewells Point
tidal gauge in Norfolk.41 Relative sea level further takes into account
land subsidence.42 Land subsidence is the measured sinking of the ground
due to various geological factors.43 This obviously worsens the problem
of sea level rise due to the sinking of the land in relation to the ocean.
Historic data from the Sewells Point tidal gauge located at Naval
Station Norfolk shows an average increase in sea level by 1.5 ft. per one
hundred years.44 The Virginia Climate Change Commission reported that,
region-wide, the Chesapeake Bay area would see an increase in sea level
by 0.7–1.6 m (2.3–5.2 ft.) by 2100.45 The rate of rise in the Hampton Roads
area is twice that of the global measurement.46 This is due to a higher
rate of land subsidence, ocean circulation factors, and overall sea level
rise acceleration.47 Specifically, at the Sewells Point tide gauge, projec-
tions noting these factors place the level as high as 2.5 ft. of increase by
37 See 2014 NCA, supra note 24, at 582.
38 IPCC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7–8.
39 NOAA REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.
40 Id. at 6, n. 2.
41 See Larry P. Atkinson et al., Sea Level Rise and Flooding Risk in Virginia 5 SEA GRANT
L. & POL’Y J. 3, 4–5 (2013).
42 Id. at 6.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 5.
45 VA. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FINAL REPORT: A CLIMATE CHANGE
ACTION PLAN 5 (2008), [hereinafter 2008 VIRGINIA COMMISSION] http://www.sealevelrise
virginia.net/docs/homepage/CCC_Final_Report-Final_12152008.pdf [https://perma.cc/M883
-E6RR].
46 Atkinson et al., supra note 41, at 7.
47 Id. at 7–10.
2016] WAGING WAR ON THE RISING SEAS 271
2100.48 “This local rise rate is nearly the highest rise rate seen anywhere
in the U.S.”49
Further, as was noted previously, this rise in sea levels will intensify
flooding problems. First, there will be more frequent and severe recurrent
flooding due to regular tides and “high intensity rain events.”50 Second,
studies predict that the occurrences of extreme, storm-induced flooding are
also likely to increase.51 Storms themselves are likely to become more fre-
quent, thereby bringing the problem of storm surge.52 For example, an ex-
treme event such as a so-called 100-year flood, which at the Sewells Point
tide gauge is 5.5 ft. above the high tide line, has a one percent per year
likelihood of occurrence.53 That percentage increases to ten percent within
just the medium-range projections for sea level rise.54 What are considered
record floods now could become an almost annual happening by 2060.55
Many of these effects are already being seen in some of Hampton
Roads’ more lowland areas.56 Areas throughout the City of Norfolk, such as
the Hague neighborhood, already see almost regular street flooding.57
With the predictions of increasing sea levels and storms, this is only
likely to increase.
C. Impacts on Hampton Roads’ Military Installations
Hampton Roads is home to several military installations that
house or perform strategically critical missions. Naval Station Norfolk
48 Id. at 9–10.
49 Id. at 10.
50 See VA. INST. OF MARINE SCIENCE, RECURRENT FLOODING STUDY FOR TIDEWATER VIRGINIA
10–13 (2013), http://ccrm.vims.edu/recurrent_flooding/Recurrent_Flooding_Study_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CZ7F-ZS34].
51 Id.
52 See id. at 11 (noting the increase in tropical storms and winter storms in the past
century and the continued upward projections into the future). See also id. at 8 (stating,
for example, that a passing storm may cause the ocean in Hampton Roads to be three feet
above what would normally be expected from the tide. Thus, the storm surge is three feet.
Local sea level rise means that years from, now the same storm would result in a three-
foot and two-inch rise, approximately).
53 BEN STRAUSS ET AL., CLIMATE CENTRAL, VIRGINIA AND THE SURGING SEA: A VULNER-
ABILITY ASSESSMENT WITH PROJECTIONS FOR SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOOD RISK
12 (2014), http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/uploads/ssrf/VA-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2MY9-8RNH].
54 Id. at 13.
55 Id. at 10.
56 Atkinson et al., supra note 41, at 11.
57 Id. (noting also the “exponential” increase in these large flooding events as compared
to past measurements).
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is the largest naval base in the United States and is home to the bulk of
the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, which also includes several major shore com-
mands, and an airfield.58 Norfolk Naval Shipyard, located in Portsmouth,
is an important ship repair facility with the capabilities of maintaining
and refueling nuclear powered ships.59 Joint Base Langley-Eustis (for-
merly known as Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis separately), in
Hampton, houses Air Force fighter squadrons and the Air Force’s Air
Combat Command.60 Other military facilities in the area include Naval
Air Station Oceana, Dam Neck Annex, and Joint Base Little Creek–Fort
Story.61 These facilities house everything from several Navy aircraft
squadrons to Navy amphibious forces and training facilities.62 Installa-
tion resilience is key to ensuring the military is fully ready to meet its
mission.63 Installations function as “power projection platforms.”64 The
compromising of base functions harms a direct link in the nation’s de-
fense policy.65
It is worth noting here that sea level rise is but one problem within
the realm of climate change’s effects on military installations writ large.66
In addition to sea level rise, for example, studies are being conducted to
measure the possible effects of increased heat waves and water short-
ages.67 Further, much has been written about the various national secu-
rity problems that climate change will thrust upon the military. Policy
58 KELLY A. BURKS-COPES ET AL., RISK QUANTIFICATION FOR SUSTAINING COASTAL MILI-
TARY INSTALLATION ASSET AND MISSION CAPABILITIES (RC-1701): FINAL REPORT, U.S.
ARMY ENGINEER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER 8 (2014), https://www.serdp-estcp
.org/content/download/30139/291303/file/RC_1701_Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SXZ3-L74N].
59 See NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD, http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Shipyards/Norfolk
.aspx [https://perma.cc/655A-UJTC] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
60 JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS: UNITS, http://www.jble.af.mil/units/airforceunits/ [https://
perma.cc/Q4CZ-B32D] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
61 See NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrma/installations
/nas_oceana.html [https://perma.cc/9LCT-T6YX] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); JOINT BASE
LITTLE CREEK-FORT STORY, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrma/installations/jeb_lit
tle_creek_fort_story.html [https://perma.cc/3G9Z-4PQH] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
62 Id.
63 2014 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 10.
64 Id. (internal quotes omitted).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 6–7.
67 See STRATEGIC ENVTL. RES. & DEV. PROGRAM, ASSESSING IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON COASTAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 4–5 (2013) [hereinafter
SERDP POLICY IMPLICATIONS], https://www.serdp-estcp.org/content/download/17219/192
680/version/1/file/SERDP+Coastal+Assessment+White+Paper_January+2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TKT7-9MSM].
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makers, scholars, and government agencies have begun to look at the
national security implications of climate change scenarios that may
affect mass migration of people, economic problems, and increased activ-
ity in the Arctic, to name a few.68
1. Effect of Sea Level Rise on National Security Infrastructure in
Hampton Roads
An American Security Project study quoting the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review shows that there are thirty U.S. military installations
at risk because of sea level rise.69 Naval Station Norfolk is listed as one
of the top five most at-risk bases.70 The interagency Strategic Environ-
mental Research and Development Program (“SERDP”), along with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other researchers, has already begun
studies on the impacts of sea level rise and sea level rise consequences.
Compounding the regional problem of sea level rise and increased
flooding that has already been discussed is the flat, low-lying nature of
these installations and Naval Station Norfolk in particular.71 The subsi-
dence rate measured at the Sewells Point tide gauge was 2.72 mm per
year from 1976–2007.72 Naval Station Norfolk lies on average at under
5.6 m above mean sea level.73 Additionally, forty percent of Joint Base
Langley-Eustis and thirty percent of Norfolk Naval Shipyard lie below
the five-feet-over-high-tide line.74
With this starting point, flooding increases “exponentially” when
modeling higher sea level scenarios.75 SERDP reports, for example, that
“surge generated by all five [modeled] storms inundated approximately
50–80% of Naval Station Norfolk under the 2.0 m [sea level rise] sce-
nario.”76 This same study also conducted risk assessments for the Naval
68 See, e.g., John Podesta and Peter Ogden, Security Implications of Climate Change, 31
THE WASH. Q. 115 (2008); JOSHUA W. BUSBY, CLIMATE CHANGE & NAT’L SECURITY,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 32 (2007); NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS (2012), http://www
.dni.gov/nic/globaltrends [https://perma.cc/PH6V-Y8PE].
69 CATHERINE FOLEY, AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT: CLIMATE SECURITY, MILITARY BASING
AND CLIMATE CHANGE, 1 (2012).
70 Id. at 4.
71 See BURKS-COPES ET AL., supra note 58, at 9.
72 Id. at 143.
73 Id. at 9.
74 STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 53, at 15.
75 BURKS-COPES ET AL., supra note 58, at 175.
76 Id.
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Station’s piers, which both berth and provide critical services for the
Atlantic Fleet’s ships.77 The results were not encouraging. At one pier,
sea level rise of at least 1.0 m saw major ship services such as oily waste,
wastewater, steam, electricity, and potable water all interrupted.78
These predictions show that military readiness at these bases is
likely to be severely threatened. Catastrophic disturbances of use caused
by storms as well as the regular interruption of basic services would
severely inhibit routine operations, training, and ship maintenance. The
impacts on the bases themselves are only part of the story—the bases
themselves depend on the local communities.
2. Implications on the Local Community: Effects on Bases
The impact of sea level rise on the Hampton Roads region has
already been discussed supra. Specifically, though, it is important to see
how these impacts will be felt concerning key services the military relies
upon to complete their mission. These services include transportation,
utilities, and housing. Addressing the Hampton Roads Transportation
Planning Organization (“TPO”) board, retired Rear Admiral Byron Tobin
stated “we are dependent, in large measure, upon the resources and sup-
port of this region for the efficient and successful conduct of our mission.”79
Rear Admiral Tobin further stated that “[o]ne of the key compo-
nents of that success is mobility, [which is currently impeded] because
our transportation infrastructure is in decline and struggling to meet our
needs.”80 The transportation issues related to Hampton Roads military
bases cover everything from logistical support, to military forces, to daily
commuting for service members and government civilians.81 Several of
the major interstates in the region, which are interconnected through a
system of tunnels and bridges, serve Naval Station Norfolk and other
military installations in some capacity.82 For example, some sixty percent
77 See generally id. (studying references methodology and risk assessments for evaluating
Naval Station Norfolk piers).
78 SERDP POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 67, at 5.
79 HAMPTON ROADS TRANSP. PLANNING ORG., HAMPTON ROADS TRANSPORTATION MILITARY
NEEDS STUDY: ROADWAYS SERVING THE MILITARY AND SEA LEVEL RISE/STORM SURGE 7
(2013) [hereinafter HRTPO TRANSP. REPORT], http://www.hrtpo.org/uploads/docs/Road
ways%20Serving%20the%20Military%20&%20Sea%20Level%20Rise-Storm%20Surge
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZJ9-YRK4].
80 Id.
81 See id. at 7–9.
82 Id. at 10–13.
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of land within Norfolk identified as “developed” has potential to flood
with 119 miles of roadway also susceptible to flooding.83 The various
identified impacts include: “flooding of evacuation routes” during storm
surge events, “increased hydraulic pressure on tunnels” that are rou-
tinely used for commuting and logistical operations, “alteration in drain-
age capacity” for roadways, and other effects such as erosion which may
degrade transportation infrastructure over time.84
Critical, locally provided utilities such as water/sewer and elec-
tricity are further likely to be affected. Higher levels of storm surge and
tidal flooding may lead to salt water intrusion into local aquifers.85 Addi-
tionally, up to five power plants in the Hampton Roads area could be
affected by the rising seas.86
Finally, the local sea level rise will most certainly affect housing
and residential quality of life. Thousands of residents sit below the five-
and nine-feet-above-high-tide levels exposing their properties to many of
the potential dangers of increased flooding.87 With this, home values, and
several additional related issues are implicated.88 This, along with com-
muting issues discussed supra, can likely affect service members’ and
civilian workers’ quality of life, which could potentially also have far
reaching effects into military personnel systems and readiness.
II. CURRENT POLICY RESPONSES TO SEA LEVEL RISE
Combating climate change and its effects such as sea level rise can
be categorized in two ways: mitigation and adaptation.89 Mitigation gener-
ally encompasses efforts to slow or reverse the warming of the planet by
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.90 Adaptation entails policies and
actions that are meant to counter present as well as predicted climate
change effects.91 Adaptation can “broad[ly include] retreat, accommodation,
83 Id. at 19.
84 Id. at 20.
85 SERDP POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 67, at 6.
86 STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 53, at 16.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 Trip Pollard, Damage Control: Adapting Transportation to a Changing Climate, 39 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 365, 377 (2015).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 378.
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and protection.”92 All three of these types of adaptation can be used ex-
clusively or concurrently depending on the unique situation.
Both the DoD and executive levels had not begun to address the
problems until around 2009–10.93 This should come as no surprise since
these problems are so closely linked to the politically charged issue of
climate change, and 2008 saw the election of President Barack Obama
who had vowed to make climate change issues a priority.94 Since this
time, much of the response has centered on studying the overall causes
and effects of the problem with some resources put to both adaptation
and mitigation efforts. This Note will focus exclusively on DoD and
Hampton Roads area adaptation responses, rather than climate change
mitigation policies.
A. The General DoD Sea Level Rise Response
1. Presidential Executive Orders
The genesis for the DoD response to the rising seas can be seen
mainly in the direct policies of the Obama White House. Without any
kind of overarching legislation from Congress, the Administration has
resorted to the use of non-statutory means to accomplish climate change
adaptation goals for federal agencies.95 Most relevant to DoD efforts to
prepare for and combat the effects of sea level rise specifically are Execu-
tive Orders 13653, 13690, and 13693.
Executive Order (“EO”) 13653 speaks directly to the need to
implement climate change resiliency measures.96 The EO established a
council on climate change preparedness and resilience that includes
senior members from all federal departments and certain agencies.97
92 Joshua G. Behr et al., Building Resiliency in Response to Sea Level Rise and Recurrent
Flooding: Comprehensive Planning in Hampton Roads, 92 THE VA. NEWS LETTER 1, 2
(2016); Pollard, supra note 89, at 378 (referring to these three adaptation categories as
“(1) fortify . . . (2) adjust . . . and (3) retreat.”).
93 See infra Part II (discussing Presidential Executive Orders and DoD-level policy).
94 See John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html [https://perma.cc
/8MPK-Z3TA].
95 See Obama’s Green Gamble, THE ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY IN AM. (Jun. 3, 2014, 12:36 AM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/06/climate-policy [https://perma
.cc/4F2V-NYWF].
96 Exec. Order No. 13,653, 3 C.F.R. § 330 (2014).
97 Id. at 334–35.
2016] WAGING WAR ON THE RISING SEAS 277
Most importantly, though, the EO charges federal agencies with continu-
ing to include climate change considerations in agency planning with a
particular focus on climate adaptation and resilience.98
EO 13690, entitled “Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management
Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stake-
holder Input,” amended an older executive order and provided for guide-
lines when developing areas that are in flood plain.99 EO 13693 updated
an earlier, consequential, Obama Administration order—EO 13514.100
Executive Order 13514, issued in 2009 during Obama’s first term
in office, did not focus as much on federal facility adaptation to the ef-
fects of climate change, but instead addressed federal government stan-
dards regarding sustainability and energy efficiency to include targeted
greenhouse gas emissions.101 It sought to make the federal government
a model and “lead by example” in energy use.102 Additionally, EO 13514
required the submission of Strategic Sustainability Performance Plans
(“SSPP”) to ensure integration of this EO into agency budgeting and
decision-making.103 This EO essentially had the effect of prioritizing cli-
mate change planning in federal processes.104 EO 13693, signed in March
2015, built on the earlier order by further specifying roles within the gov-
ernment to manage sustainability.105 Of note, EO 13693 singled out DoD
(among others) to “convene regional interagency workgroups to identify
and address . . . climate change preparedness and resilience planning in
coordination with State, local, and tribal communities . . . .”106
In 2013, the President also issued the Climate Action Plan.107 This
document summarized the President’s climate change priorities focusing
on both mitigation and adaptation.108 It again called on federal agencies
98 Id. at 333.
99 See Exec. Order No. 13,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 6,425 (Feb. 4, 2015).
100 Exec. Order No. 13,693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15,871, 15,880 (Mar. 25, 2015).
101 Exec. Order No. 13,514, 3 C.F.R. § 248 (2010).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 255.
104 Id. (stating “each agency Plan shall[ ] . . . evaluate agency climate-change risks and
vulnerabilities to manage the effects of climate change on the agency’s operations and
mission in both the short and long term . . .”).
105 Exec. Order No. 13,693, 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,871.
106 Id. at 15,879.
107 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ST49-9YEK].
108 See id. at 4–5.
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to prioritize resilience planning and adaptation efforts, as well as com-
prehensively coordinate with local, state, and tribal governments.109
2. DoD Adaptation Policy
Like other applicable departments and agencies, the Department
of Defense began the task of implementing these Executive Orders and
began promulgating guidance. However, there had been some movement
to begin to address the broader problem of climate change and the spe-
cific problem of sea level rise from a national security perspective. As far
back as 2003, researchers within the Department conducted a study
called “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for
United States National Security.”110 Apart from this, however, it was not
until 2009 that large initiatives started to take place. In 2009, the Navy
formed its Task Force Climate Change.111 The Chief of Naval Operations
formed this Task Force with the mission of studying climate change im-
pacts first on Navy Arctic policy, and later on climate change effects on
the Force itself.112 The Task Force developed and released the Navy’s
Climate Change Roadmap in May 2010.113 This was a broad document
that addressed many of the strategic and operational impacts that climate
change would have on Navy missions.114 Included in the document,
though, were recommendations to study sea level rise effects and make
investments in adaptation.115
That same year, the release of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (“QDR”) showed a true shift in how seriously the entire depart-
ment would begin addressing the overall climate change problem. The
2010 QDR has really served as the “foundation” of DoD’s current outlook
on climate change.116 The 2010 QDR listed impacts on defense installa-
tions as one of the “two broad ways” that climate change would affect
109 Id. at 12–13.
110 See PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY (2003), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai
/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA469325 [https://perma.cc
/YB8D-UQPG].
111 U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 13.
112 ADM J.W. GREENERT, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, TASK FORCE CLIMATE
CHANGE CHARTER 2 (2009), http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2010/09/Task-Force-Climate
-Change-Charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H4Z-BESP].
113 U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 13.
114 See generally NAVY CLIMATE CHANGE ROADMAP, supra note 14.
115 See id. at 13–17.
116 2014 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 2.
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DoD operations.117 It specifically called on the use of the Strategic Envi-
ronmental Research and Development Program (SERDP), an organiza-
tion of multiple federal departments and agencies of which DoD is a part,
to study the problem more fully and “develop climate change assessment
tools.”118 The SERDP studies began in the years that followed, culminat-
ing in a 360-plus page report on coastal installations that was released
in 2014.119 These have provided the quantitative basis for understanding
the exact impacts that sea level rise will have on DoD infrastructure.
In 2012, the department promulgated its first Climate Change
Roadmap, which laid out plans to implement EO 13514.120 Georgetown Cli-
mate Center, on their website, summarizes the roadmap’s four goals as
follows: “(1) Define a coordinating body to address climate change; (2) uti-
lize a robust decision-making approach based on the best available science;
(3) integrate climate change considerations into existing processes; and
(4) collaborate with Federal agencies and other key partners on chal-
lenges of climate change.”121 The Roadmap further pointed out that the
Department was pushing forward with climate change adaptation and
resilience projects and was studying the effects of climate change on
coastal military bases.122
In 2014, the Department released a new Climate Change Road-
map that continued the push to further adopt climate change and sea
level rise planning into DoD operations.123 Specifically, the 2014 Roadmap
had the stated purpose of “increas[ing] the Department’s resilience to the
impacts of climate change.”124 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel even
specifically singled out Hampton Roads in his foreword to the document.125
Among other things, the Roadmap delegated authority over climate change
resilience to the Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Envi-
ronment, reported on implementation of Executive Orders 13514 and
13653, and updated Department-wide goals.126
117 2010 QDR, supra note 12, at 84–85.
118 Id. at 86.
119 See BURKS-COPES ET AL., supra note 58.
120 See U.S. Department of Defense 2012 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, GEORGE-
TOWN CLIMATE CENTER, http://www.georgetownclimate.org/resources/us-department-of
-defense-2012-climate-change-adaptation-roadmap [https://perma.cc/6ENL-4NHV] (last
visited Oct. 24, 2016).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See 2014 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 16.
124 Id. at 1.
125 Chuck Hagel, Foreword, 2014 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 16.
126 2014 DOD ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 1–3.
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Finally, and most recently as of this writing, the DoD released a
comprehensive directive focused solely on climate change adaptation—
DoD Directive 4715.21: Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience.127
This directive’s purpose specifically states that it is in response to EO
13653 and that it will apply the 2014 DoD Climate Change Roadmap
guidance by assigning direct responsibilities and promulgating guidance
to those officials.128 Of most relevance here, the directive: (1) assigns the
role of “primary climate change adaptation official” to the Assistant Secre-
tary for Energy, Installations, and Environment (“ASD(EI&E)”) with re-
sponsibility to “develop[ ] DoD climate change adaptation and resilience
policy”; (2) tasks the ASD(EI&E) to “[o]versee[ ] . . . research, develop-
ment, testing, and evaluation programs” related to adaptation/resilience
efforts; (3) directs him or her to factor climate change resilience and adap-
tation planning into “installation planning and basing processes,” as well
as advising on updates to the Unified Facilities Criteria; and (4) using
the Joint Land Use Study Program (JLUS) to help “[e]ngage[ ] with State
and local governments . . . .”129 The points regarding JLUS and the Unified
Facilities Criteria Program potentially represent an interesting way for-
ward in utilizing tools already available to the Department when combat-
ing sea level rise.130
In Hampton Roads, possibly one of the most visible DoD efforts at
sea level rise adaptation has been the Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise
Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Planning Pilot Project.
While this is a voluntary intergovernmental working group that is looking
at several sea level rise issues outside of military installation effects, it
has been endorsed by the DoD as part of implementation of EO 13653.131
This pilot project involves stakeholders from across the spectrum,
including federal, state, regional, and local governmental bodies, as well
127 See DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 4715.21: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE (2016)
[hereinafter DOD ADAPTATION DIRECTIVE], http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf
/471521p.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A75-6A2Q].
128 Id. at 1.
129 Id. at 4–5.
130 See infra Parts III.A and III.B (discussing both of these programs and their potential
uses).
131 See About the Intergovernmental Planning Project, THE CENTER FOR SEA LEVEL RISE,
http://www.centerforsealevelrise.org/about-the-center-for-sea-level-rise/ [https://perma.cc
/2LFW-TXEL] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); Office of Undersec’y of Defense (Acquisition,
Tech. & Logistics), Memorandum for Assistant Sec’y of the Army (Installations, Energy
and Env’t), Assistant Sec’y of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Env’t), Assistant Sec’y
of the Air Force (Installations, Energy and Env’t): DoD Climate Preparedness and
Resiliency Planning Projects (2014) (on file with author).
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as academic and other non-governmental entities.132 The project has
already completed “Phase I” of the project.133 Phase I served as a founda-
tional effort to bring all stakeholders together to amass all the various
reports, studies, and best-practices into certain deliverables that will inform
future efforts of the project.134 It also firmly established the organiza-
tional structure.135 Phase II is currently underway and will culminate in
a Memorandum of Understanding that will end the pilot project and estab-
lish a permanent intergovernmental working group.136 This has been an
extremely valuable effort in helping to bridge any divides in the adapta-
tion goals from both the DoD and local perspectives.
B. Local and State Sea Level Rise Adaptation Policy in
Hampton Roads
Again, since DoD facilities are dependent on nearby localities, it
is important also to take note of non-federal adaptation efforts. In Hampton
Roads, as the effects of worsening sea level rise have become evident,137
there has been some movement at the state, regional, and local levels to
study the problem and implement adaptation efforts. However, like at
the federal level, the sea level rise issue has been affected by the broader
politics of climate change.138 This has subjected state-level adaptation
policy to the “pendulum swings” of state-wide elections.139 Notwithstand-
ing this fact, localities in Hampton Roads have been implementing some
planning and adaptation efforts.140 Below is a summary of recent sea
level rise policy initiatives at both the state and regional/local levels.
132 HAMPTON ROADS SEA LEVEL RISE PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PLANNING PILOT PROJECT, CHARTER 2–3 (2014) [hereinafter PILOT PROJECT CHARTER],
http://www.centerforsealevelrise.org/research-resources/pilot-project-resources/ [https://
perma.cc/Q5UA-PSST].
133 HAMPTON ROADS SEA LEVEL RISE PREPAREDNESS AND RESILIENCE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL PILOT PROJECT, CHARTER 2–3 (2014) [hereinafter PHASE 1 REPORT] http://www.cen
terforsealevelrise.org/research-resources/pilot-project-resources/ [https://perma.cc/Q5UA
-PSST].
134 See PILOT PROJECT CHARTER, supra note 132, at 1–2.
135 PHASE 1 REPORT, supra note 133, at 12–13.
136 THE CENTER FOR SEA LEVEL RISE, supra note 131.
137 See supra Part I.B.
138 Pollard, supra note 89, at 386–87; see also Atkinson et al., supra note 41, at 13 (noting
that “[u]nfortunately, the issue has been highly politicized which has made a regional or
state approach difficult.”).
139 Pollard, supra note 89, at 387.
140 Id. at 388.
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1. State-Level Sea Level Rise Policy in Virginia
State-level policy in Virginia has been inconsistent in the recent
past, showing conflicting periods of strong focus on the topic with serious
lulls in state-led efforts at studying and combating sea level rise ef-
fects.141 Governor Tim Kaine established a Climate Change Commission
in 2008 to tackle a number of issues, including both mitigation and adapta-
tion efforts.142 The Commission affirmed sea level rise projections and
produced a number of proposals to be implemented at all levels of gov-
ernment within Virginia.143 Only a handful of these recommendations
have been implemented with some in progress, and all of these imple-
mentations were at the local and not state level.144
There has, within the last three years, been some slow movement
within both the legislative and executive branches.145 The General
Assembly requested a Virginia Institute of Marine Science study on re-
curring flooding and later created subcommittees and panels that would
develop recommendations on the issue of recurrent flooding.146 Recently,
the General Assembly ordered localities within the Hampton Roads
Planning District to incorporate sea level rise adaptation in their long
range land use plans.147 Also, while the 2008 Commission’s recommenda-
tions had been “effectively shelved” from 2010–2014,148 recently elected
Governor Terry McAuliffe established a new commission by executive
order.149 This new commission released their report in December 2015,
which contained several positive recommendations, including some that
have already been implemented.150
141 See William Stiles et al., The Policy Climate for Climate Change in Virginia: Overview
of Adaptation Policy, Planning and Implementation Landscape, 5 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y
J. 15, 20–22 (2013).
142 Id. at 20.
143 See 2008 VIRGINIA COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 4–6, 32–39.
144 See Stiles et al., supra note 141, at 21.
145 See Pollard, supra note 89, at 387–88.
146 Id.
147 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223.3 (2016) (“Beginning July 1, 2015, any locality included in
the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission shall incorporate into the next scheduled
and all subsequent reviews of its comprehensive plan strategies to combat projected
relative sea-level rise and recurrent flooding.”).
148 Pollard, supra note 89, at 387.
149 Va. Exec. Order 19 (July 1, 2014), https://governor.virginia.gov/media/3348/eo-19-con
vening-the-governors-climate-change-and-resiliency-update-commissionada.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FVD5-97CU].
150 Virginia Climate and Energy Profile, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, http://www
.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/state-information/virginia/overview.html [https://perma
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As one can see, there has been some progress at the state level in
studying and producing recommendations to combat the problem. How-
ever, what is also clearly apparent is what has been called an “imple-
mentation gap” in Virginia state adaptation policy.151 This is significant
because Virginia, as a Dillon’s Rule state, restricts the powers of its
municipalities to that which is expressly or impliedly granted by the
legislature.152 Therefore, localities are ultimately limited in the extent to
which they can respond to the problem.153
2. The Regional and Local Response
Despite inconsistent policies at the state level, there have been real
successes on the ground in Hampton Roads localities.154 While each locality
in the region is ultimately responsible for their own individual long-range
planning and infrastructure maintenance, state statute authorizes region-
wide bodies to lend assistance on these issues.155 One example is the Hamp-
ton Roads Planning District Commission (“PDC”).156 PDCs in Virginia are
provided for by statute and have the purpose of “encourag[ing] and facili-
tat[ing] local government cooperation and state-local cooperation in ad-
dressing on a regional basis problems of greater than local significance.”157
The Hampton Roads PDC, along with another regional body—the Hamp-
ton Roads Transportation Planning Organization (“HR-TPO”)158—has to
.cc/Q29L-NVD6] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (implementing recommendations include the
appointment of a state “Chief Resiliency Officer” as well as “developing a state-wide pro-
tocol for sea-level rise projections.” Additional, not-yet-implemented recommendations
include looking for ways to provide “technical” assistance to policy makers and exploring
funding sources for resiliency efforts); see also GOVERNOR TERENCE R. MCAULIFFE’S CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND RESILIENCY UPDATE COMMISSION, REPORT AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE GOVERNOR (2015), https://naturalresources.virginia.gov/media/5101/climate-commis
sion-and-resiliency-update-commission-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXK4-8GHQ].
151 Stiles et al., supra note 141, at 27.
152 Id. at 17 (stating that “municipal governments have only those powers which are
expressly granted by the state legislature, those powers fairly or necessarily implied from
expressly granted powers, and those powers which are essential and indispensable.”
quoting Commonwealth v. Cty. Bd. of Arlington Cty., 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (Va. 1977)).
153 See id. at 28.
154 Pollard, supra note 89, at 388 (noting “[m]ost of the adaptation activity in Virginia has
been at the local and regional level.”).
155 See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-4207 (2016).
156 See About, HAMPTON ROADS PLANNING DISTRICT COMM’N, http://www.hrpdcva.gov/page
/about [https://perma.cc/L7ZH-WXFU] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
157 VA. CODE ANN.§ 15.2-4207(A) (2016).
158 About Us, HAMPTON ROADS TRANSPORTATION PLANNING ORG. http://www.hrtpo.org/page
/about-us [https://perma.cc/3GV6-Z6ZL] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (stating that HR-TPO
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date released several helpful studies and provided mechanisms that can
support local government long-range planning efforts.159
As stated, these regional bodies can only provide support and
assistance. The localities themselves are required to conduct long range
planning and to include sea level rise projections within those plans.160
Even as of a few years ago, most Hampton Roads localities were already
making headway in their local planning processes.161 Unfortunately,
actual adaptation efforts have at times been uneven and “ad hoc.”162
However, some localities have been leaders in their adaptation
efforts. For example, the City of Norfolk, as of a few years ago, had already
developed a “comprehensive ‘Flooding Strategy’.”163 Further, one author
labeled the city a “national leader in planning for sea level rise . . . .”164
Additionally, Norfolk political leadership has been unafraid to publicly
address the problem.165 For example, Norfolk Mayor Paul Fraim has even
publicly raised the possibility of a “managed retreat.”166
Like at the state level, there is measured progress. However,
there is still work to be done. Current gaps exist in local abilities to meet
high-cost adaptation demands as well as a coherent region-wide response
that goes beyond the planning stage to actual implementation.167 Again,
these issues are important to consider from a defense perspective based
on the need for a concerted effort across all levels of government to
address the sea level rise issue.
C. Legal Issues with the Current Sea Level Rise Response
In the face of Congressional inaction, the President has taken sev-
eral executive actions to spur federal agencies into taking into account
is the federally mandated Metropolitan Planning Organization for the Hampton Roads
area. It has the mission “to conduct a continuing, cooperative and comprehensive trans-
portation planning process.”).
159 Pollard, supra note 89, at 388–89.
160 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2223 to 2223.3 (2016).
161 See Stiles et al., supra note 141, at 25 (Table 2).
162 Id. at 16, 27.
163 Atkinson et al., supra note 41, at 14.
164 Pollard, supra note 89, at 389 (including examples of “conducting flooding studies, adopt-
ing a coastal resilience strategy, and developing a billion-dollar package of floodwalls, tide
gates, elevated roadways, and other projects to protect houses and infrastructure.”).
165 See Stiles et al., supra note 141, at 26.
166 Id.
167 See Pollard, supra note 89, at 389.
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climate change resilience planning.168 While a lot of this Note up to this
point has examined the specific, “on-the-ground” causes/effects of sea
level rise, as well as responses at various levels of government, this sub-
ject actually invokes large, overarching, and consequential legal issues.
Because much activity up to this point has occurred without explicit
Congressional authorization, this implicates both the power of the Execu-
tive to act within its discretion outside of explicit Congressional authority
and the amount of discretion agencies have when acting within existing
statutory frameworks.
1. Constitutional Considerations
Both the Legislature and the Executive have explicit powers granted
by the Constitution regarding the military. Implicated in the context of
the DoD’s response to sea level rise, Congress generally has the power
“[t]o raise and support Armies”169 as well as “[t]o provide and maintain
a Navy.”170 This refers to Congress’ so-called “power of the purse” or
spending power for national defense.171 The President, on the other hand,
is expressly designated as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Ser-
vices.172 Additionally, the President “shall take [c]are that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”173 With this basic foundation of constitutional
powers, one can easily see the conflict that could arise with these poten-
tially conflicting powers.
Commander Mark Nevitt, writing in the Cardozo Law Review,
described the implications that can arise with an active President re-
sponding to climate change scenarios regarding the military in the face
of an inactive Congress.174 He outlines the full range of needed responses
to climate change by the military, from increased humanitarian assistance
operations, to increased domestic support to civil authorities, to respond-
ing to sea level rise on coastal military installations.175 He concludes that
168 See supra Part II.A.
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
170 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
171 Mark P. Nevitt, The Commander in Chief’s Authority to Combat Climate Change, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 452 (2015).
172 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (stating: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States . . .”).
173 Id. at art. II, § 3.
174 See Nevitt, supra note 171.
175 See id. at 443–48.
286 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:265
the President has far more power to respond outside of America’s borders
to the effects of climate change than the President does to impacts climate
change has on military installations.176
Nevitt’s analysis centered on the landmark U.S. Supreme Court
case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, also commonly known as
the Steel Seizure Case.177 Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in this
opinion breaks down the President’s relative power to pursue certain
courses of action in relation to Congress into three broad categories:
when the President (1) pursues an action that is directly authorized by
Congress; (2) pursues an action that Congress has neither expressly
denied or outright authorized; and (3) pursues an action that Congress
has prohibited.178 The President’s power is most legally secure when he
is acting with the authority of Congress,179 and is at its “lowest ebb” when
acting “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”180
The Youngstown analysis is instructive here. Unlike when the
President orders the military to respond to a natural disaster abroad or
even within America’s borders, funding sea level adaptation projects falls
squarely within Congress’ spending power.181 It is clear then, if Congress,
for example, specifically prohibited sea level rise adaptation efforts, the
President would be under the third and weakest Youngstown category.182
Outside of simply refusing to sign or threatening to veto such a bill,183 the
President would have little power to overcome a specific prohibition
passed by Congress under its mandate to fund the military.184 This
separation of powers analysis is a highly important consideration as it
is entirely possible that Congress’ passive inaction may turn to a con-
certed effort to limit or prohibit the DoD from pushing forward with
adaptation efforts.185
176 See id. at 475–76.
177 See id. at 473–76.
178 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952).
179 Id. at 635.
180 Id. at 637.
181 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 473 (noting that “[i]nvesting in climate resilient infra-
structure requires congressional approval because it ultimately flows from Congress’s
constitutional power of the purse.”).
182 Id. at 474.
183 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (describing the President’s role in approving or vetoing
bills).
184 See Nevitt, supra note 171, at 474.
185 See Goodell, supra note 2.
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2. Statutory Considerations
In addition to the broader separation of powers issues, questions
also arise regarding how much discretion the DoD already has to pursue
adaptation efforts through both the regular defense appropriations
process, and additionally through already-existing statutes. Since sea
level rise adaptation mainly centers on military construction projects,
this issue implicates existing laws that govern both appropriations and
authorizations for defense spending.186
Congress legally authorizes the DoD through the “increasingly
complex” annual National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”).187 As
authorizing legislation, it sets parameters and gives legal basis for DoD
undertakings and expenditures.188 Following this is the regular Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations Act and sometimes other appropriations
bills that Congress passes in order to fund the Department’s authoriza-
tions.189 Finally, “DoD must also continually spend the money appropri-
ated by Congress consistent with fiscal law principles governing purpose,
time, and amount.”190
While these authorizations and appropriations bills “appropriate
funds for baseline military operations” and “provide maximum amounts . . .
and additional purposes for which the funds may be drawn,” military
construction projects are specifically funded under the Military Construc-
tion and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.191
Construction projects are generally approved by the individual services
and are ultimately authorized and appropriated by Congress through this
distinct fiscal process.192 A statute also allows that “minor military pro-
jects” can either be: (1) taken by the service secretary from appropriations
for “operation and maintenance” for up to $1,000,000193 and (2) the DoD
186 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 468.
187 Id. at 466–67.
188 See JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 11 (Congressional Research Service ed. 2014) (noting that “[a]uthorization acts
establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs.”).
189 Id. at 12 (stating “[a]ppropriations measures provide new budget authority for programs,
activities, or agencies previously authorized.”).
190 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 468.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 468–69 (citing the statute that defines a military construction project as “con-
struction, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a
military installation, whether to satisfy temporary or permanent requirements . . . .” 10
U.S.C. § 2801(a) (2016)).
193 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 469–70 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2805(c)).
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has the discretion to implement an “unspecified” development for up to
$3,000,000, and can increase that amount to $4,000,000 if it “is intended
solely to correct a deficiency that is life-threatening, health-threatening,
or safety-threatening.”194 All the various complex fiscal legal constraints
are beyond the scope of this Note, but these broad funding statutes are
some of the more significant ones that affect and ultimately constrain sea
level rise adaptation efforts taken by the DoD on its own.
III. ADAPTING EXISTING FRAMEWORKS TO COMBAT SEA LEVEL RISE
While much has already been done to begin to address the sea
level rise issue, much work certainly lies ahead. Assuming the absence
of an overarching statutory response from Congress, the question then
becomes—what more can be done under existing frameworks to further
address the issue? Along with that inquiry, other questions arise such as
the legal questions regarding the proper levels of authority.
In Hampton Roads (and the DoD broadly), there are three areas
in which progress can be made under existing frameworks. First, Hampton
Roads installations can continue to maximize discretionary use of con-
struction and repair money in order to fund future adaptation projects.
Additionally, the DoD needs to finish revising its Unified Facilities Criteria
to more fully implement adaptation and resiliency concepts. Second, as has
already been suggested in the recent DoD Climate Change Directive,195
installations and the local region need to take advantage of the existing
Joint Land Use Study (“JLUS”) program to better close coordination gaps.
Finally, the DoD needs to recommend that Congress authorize a new Base
Realignment and Closure (“BRAC”) Commission, and the Commission
needs to use sea level rise and climate change factors as important cri-
teria when formulating recommendations.
A. Adapting Installations: Maximizing Use of the Unified
Facilities Criteria and the Military Construction
Appropriations System
As has already been discussed, large or “major,” military construc-
tion projects require congressional approval, which may present issues
in the current political environment. This forces the military to reach
194 10 U.S.C. § 2805(a)(2).
195 See DOD ADAPTATION DIRECTIVE, supra note 127, at 5.
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into other appropriations in order to fund adaptation. For new projects,
the Services still have discretion to spend within one million and three-
to-four million dollar caps for “minor” developments.196 While this doesn’t
sound like much, it could at least be a partial solution continuing forward
and would ensure that smaller adaptation projects are implemented.
However, this is ultimately not a strong solution for a couple of
reasons. Many of the adaptation projects that need to be completed are
vastly more expensive than what these small levels allow.197 For example,
at Naval Station Norfolk, the cost of updating one pier has been estimated
at thirty-five to forty million dollars.198 Also, the current DoD directive for
military construction discourages the overuse of discretionary categories.199
Balanced against other policy considerations such as overall fiscal con-
straints, this policy should probably stay unchanged.
What may prove more effective are the Services’ repair funds.200
Title 10 allows the Secretary of a military department to spend up to $7.5
million for a repair project drawn from operation and maintenance funds
without congressional notification.201 Installations could use this larger
amount to better fund adaptation efforts concerning existing facilities,
especially when restoring facilities damaged by sea level rise effects, for
example. Examples might include some of the adaptation-focused repairs
at Langley discussed supra in the introduction202. It is important to note
here that while Congress has been absent on many climate change is-
sues, this does not mean the institution has been halting all military
construction that represents progress in the adaptation effort. For exam-
ple, the recently passed 2016 budget allocated large sums of money for
military-wide construction projects that included repairs to Naval Sta-
tion Norfolk piers.203
196 See supra Part II.C.
197 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 440 n. 10 (noting one estimate that places upgrading Naval Sta-
tion Norfolk’s infrastructure as high as $460 million, citing FORBES TOMPKINS & CHRISTINA
DECONCINI, WORLD RES. INST., SEA-LEVEL RISE AND ITS IMPACT ON VIRGINIA 2 (2014)).
198 Matt Connolly, Hampton Roads, Virginia and the Military’s Battle Against Sea Level
Rise, 27 BRIEFER 1, 3 (2015).
199 UNDERSEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH. & LOGISTICS, DOD DIRECTIVE 4270.5:
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 2 (2005) [hereinafter DOD CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVE], http://
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/427005p.pdf [https://perma.cc/N38C-DH9G].
200 10 U.S.C. § 2811(e) (defining repair projects as “a project to restore a real property
facility, system, or component to such a condition that it may effectively be used for its
designated functional purpose.”).
201 Id. § 2811(d).
202 See supra Introduction.
203 Hugh Lessig, Defense policy bill passes, allows funding for projects in Hampton Roads,
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Since the prioritization task falls on the Services themselves, this
part of the process becomes very important as well. A Government Account-
ability Office (“GAO”) study released in 2014 found that adaptation
projects were being severely under-prioritized next to other construction
projects.204 A lot of this had to do with institutional considerations as “[i]n-
stallation officials explained that they generally have not proposed projects
to address potential climate change impacts or vulnerabilities because
they believe that adaptation projects will not compete well in the . . .
processes for approving and funding potential projects.”205 It next points
out that this will leave large gaps between the Department’s overall goals
(as outlined in the stacks of policy papers and studies that have been
released since 2009) and what is actually being achieved at the installa-
tion level.206
The study gives an example of a Navy shipyard needing to build up
flood protection in order to prevent damage to vessels in dry dock.207 While
the study does not specifically identify where this shipyard is located, this
type of project would be very applicable to somewhere like Norfolk Naval
Shipyard. The study recommends that climate change effects need to be
made an explicit criteria for proposing and funding construction projects—
whether they be new, individual projects, or parts of existing projects.208
In some of the DoD’s responses to the study’s recommendations, it af-
firmed that among other initiatives, it was working to revise one such
mechanism that can potentially help work climate change adaptation more
firmly into everyday decision-making—the Unified Facilities Criteria.209
The UFC is “analogous to state and local zoning and building
regulations, and is utilized by military planners and engineers to design
and build new military construction.”210 The UFC “is [also] de-linked from
DAILY PRESS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.dailypress.com/news/military/dp-nws-ndaa-hamp
ton-roads-20151007-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z6CG-DKSE].
204 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-446, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: DOD
CAN IMPROVE INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING AND PROCESSES TO BETTER ACCOUNT FOR
POTENTIAL IMPACTS 39 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 GAO Report], http://www.gao.gov/assets
/670/663734.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2KT-WHQA].
205 Id. at 43 (stating that “[i]f installation officials believe that potential adaptation projects
will not be approved, the number of adaptation projects they propose is likely to be fewer
than it might otherwise be . . .”).
206 Id. at 39.
207 Id. at 39–40.
208 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 204, at 45–46.
209 Id. at 47.
210 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 470.
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the . . . service-focused military construction and funding process.”211 For
these two reasons, it is a great vehicle to ensure resiliency and adapta-
tion measures are factored into any new military construction project.
The current UFC master planning document, released in 2012,
refers to “climatic conditions” that need to be taken into account, and
also refers to the National Climate Assessment as a source of data for
future conditions.212 However, the document does not go further than
that and does not define the terms, nor does it make climate change plan-
ning a requirement.213 As stated earlier, the GAO tied its recommenda-
tions to the UFC, and the DoD stated it was in the process of revising
these planning documents.214 This was partially achieved in the release
of the recent Climate Change Adaptation and Resiliency Directive,215 but
the criteria itself is in need of updating with the completion of the sea
level rise studies. Once the UFC contains specified adaptation require-
ments, military construction efforts will then take it into account regard-
less of the funding source.216
B. Coordination with Relevant Localities: DoD Should Expand the
Use of the Joint Land Use System Program to Address Sea
Level Rise
The JLUS program stems from initiatives begun in the 1970s and
has been a useful tool for both the DoD and local communities.217 The
studies are administered by the Office of Economic Adjustment (“OEA”)
and provide a mechanism through which DoD and local communities can
coordinate and develop joint plans to both decrease the impacts of mili-
tary activities and ensure local development does not hinder installation
effectiveness.218 The process usually begins when a military base alerts
the OEA that there may be impacts on mission readiness due to local
211 Id.
212 DEP’T OF DEF., UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) 2-100-01: INSTALLATION MASTER
PLANNING ¶ 3-5.6.2.3 (2012), http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFC/ufc_2_100_01.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2CUR-U7WK].
213 Nevitt, supra note 171, at 470.
214 2014 GAO REPORT, supra note 204, at 56–57.
215 See DOD ADAPTATION DIRECTIVE, supra note 127, at 5.
216 See DOD CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVE, supra note 199, at 5.
217 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT LAND USE STUDY PROGRAM
2 (2007), http://www.mrrpc.com/Misc_pdfs/JLUS_Program_overview_1.pdf [https://perma
.cc/22LS-A9K4].
218 Id. at 1.
292 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:265
development, referred to as encroachment.219 The OEA will then evaluate
the situation based on available studies (usually looking at issues like jet
noise).220 If both the installation and localities feel that a JLUS process
would be beneficial, the process will go forward.221 The process includes
a study for which the OEA can provide technical assistance and poten-
tially funding for under Title 10.222 The final product is a set of recom-
mendations that can affect, for example, a locality’s land use ordinances
and building codes.223 Essentially, a JLUS is utilized to build accord
between the installation and neighboring communities.224
Encroachment has been defined broadly as “the cumulative result
of any and all outside influences that inhibit normal military training and
testing.”225 One such example is the increase of urban and suburban sprawl
near military bases that both interferes with neighboring localities’ use
and enjoyment of their land and also in some cases may inhibit military
readiness.226 This broad definition could potentially leave an opening to
utilize JLUS to develop coordinated sea level rise adaptation plans to a
region like Hampton Roads.
What would be innovative about such a plan is both that it targets
a problem like sea level rise, which is normally outside the usual defini-
tion of encroachment,227 and it would bring in both regional and local
actors from across a large area. A Hampton Roads sea-level-rise-focused
JLUS would involve not just multiple regional planning bodies and local
governments, it would likely involve multiple installations across differing
branches of service.
A Hampton Roads sea-level-rise JLUS could have multiple posi-
tive outcomes. First, it could serve as a way to increase information flow
between the DoD and local communities. Sometimes it is hard for the
military to communicate its needs due to security concerns, but within
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, supra note 217, at 2–3; 10 U.S.C. § 2391 (2016).
223 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, supra note 217, at 2–3.
224 Id. at 3.
225 Ryan Santicola, Encroachment: Where National Security, Land Use, and the Environ-
ment Collide, 10 ALBANY L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 329, 331 (2005) (internal quotes omitted).
226 Id. at 335.
227 See EDAW, INC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HAMPTON ROADS JOINT LAND USE STUDY (2005),
http://www.vbgov.com/government/offices/green/land-development/Documents/hr-joint
-land-use-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M6F-D25G] (showing an example of a JLUS that
was conducted looking at usual issues like jet noise).
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reason, DoD installations would now have a mechanism to let localities
know what their concerns are from a readiness standpoint (i.e., commu-
nications or electricity redundancy). Second, it can increase information
flow between localities and agencies. Some localities have put into place
more adaptation measures than others.228 This forum will be one in which
localities can identify common shortfalls and then produce plans to put
into place coordinated solutions. Third, JLUS has a funding component
that will provide grants to help fund the months-long study.229 This will
be a help to the more resource-strapped localities.
As of this writing, just such a JLUS has been proposed and is
slated to get started in Hampton Roads.230 Hopefully, this process will be
a positive one and identify solutions to some of the areas outlined. Its
results will hopefully provide concrete ways forward to neighboring areas.
C. Retreat as Adaptation: Base Closures and Realignment
Congress passed the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act
(“BRAC”) initially to establish a process to make cost-saving decisions on
installation management more efficient and less political.231 In the past,
an independent commission has been appointed to review a list of DoD-
recommended base closures and realignments.232 The Commission then
publishes its recommendations that will automatically take effect unless
Congress and the President pass a law that rejects the recommendations
within a certain period of time.233 This commission system is no longer
authorized by statute, with the last authorized round of BRAC closures
228 Stiles et al., supra note 141, at 25–27.
229 See 10 U.S.C. § 2391 (2016).
230 See CAPTAIN J.P. RIOS, CEC, USN, HOW NAVAL FACILITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS ARE
COPING WITH RISING RELATIVE SEA LEVELS 5–7 (2015), http://www.centerforsealevelrise
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Rios_NAVFAC.pdf [https://perma.cc/45R3-8PAZ] (describ-
ing a recently proposed JLUS that would tentatively be complete in 2017).
231 See George Schlossberg, How Congress Cleared the Bases: A Legislative History of
BRAC, 1 J. OF DEF. COMMUNITIES 1, 11 (2012).
232 See id. at 2–9; see also 10 U.S.C. § 2687(g)(3) (2016) (defining realignment as “any
action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does
not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel
or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.”).
233 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, “FAST TRACK” LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONGRES-
SIONAL CONSIDERATION OF A DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT (BRAC) COMMISSION
REPORT 1 (CRS 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43102.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2PKW-PLYD].
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occurring in 2005.234 The law still allows the DoD the ability to close and
to realign bases on its own within certain constraints.235
Essentially, whether future base closures/realignments are pur-
sued solely by the DoD or through the Commission, sea level rise projec-
tions must be included as important criteria. A future BRAC round (if
authorized) could, among other priorities, clearly articulate a need for
long-range sea level rise planning. Bases that are in the path of irrevers-
ible rising seas that threaten readiness at those locations should be scruti-
nized for closure/realignment. One such example in Hampton Roads is
Langley Air Force Base. Many of the key commands based at Langley could
be reassigned to inland, existing Air Force installations. Obviously, a base
like Naval Station Norfolk, that berths ships, cannot be easily realigned.
However, creative solutions, such as “hybrid floating piers,” have been
put forward to retreat from a scenario where the base has become perma-
nently compromised.236
CONCLUSION: CONGRESS, THE INDISPENSABLE PARTNER
As described in this Note, DoD and local communities have already
done much and made some progress, albeit slow, in adapting Hampton
Roads’ military installations to the rising seas. What should also be readily
apparent is that Congress is the indispensable partner in this effort.
While DoD has much room to act within its own power and the President
can issue far-reaching Executive Orders, a real adaptation effort will not
get underway until Congress gets on board. Until then, the military will
continue to make any strides it can and hopefully maintain the highest
levels of military readiness despite the ever-increasing problems of sea
level rise.
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